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RECENT DECISIONS 
CIVIL .AERONAUTICS Acr-DisCRIMINATION-PRivATE CAUSE OF Acr10N 
FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES-Plaintiff held a reconfirmed tourist reservation 
on one of defendant's St. Louis-to-Los Angeles flights. Defendant oversold 
the flight and subsequently "bumped" the plaintiff from the flight in 
favor of a first-class passenger who was given plaintiff's accommodations in 
the tourist section. Defendant's agent booked a reservation for the 
plaintiff aboard another airline and provided plaintiff with lunch. The 
only expense incurred by the plaintiff as a result of being removed from de-
fendant's flight was the cost of a telephone call to inform his wife of his new 
arrival time; and plaintiff was inconvenienced by a delay of four hours on a 
Sunday in his arrival in Los Angeles. Plaintiff instituted suit in federal dis-
trict court for actual and punitive damages alleging the violation of a fed-
eral criminal statute.1 Held, judgment for plaintiff for the cost of the 
telephone call as compensatory damages and for five thousand dollars 
as exemplary damages. Defendant unjustly discriminated against plaintiff 
in violation of section 404 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act2 by giving 
flight priority to passengers who had booked reservations subsequent to 
plaintiff's booking. This violation of a federal criminal statute creates 
an implied federal cause of action in favor of the plaintiff for both 
actual and punitive damages. Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. 
Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961). 
Where a federal criminal statute does not expressly create a civil 
remedy, the federal courts have frequently implied such a federal cause 
of action, provided that the injured party belongs to the specific class 
for whose benefit the statute was passed.3 Although the federal courts have 
never clearly explained the basis for their jurisdiction in such cases, it has 
been suggested that "federal courts have the power to afford all remedies 
necessary to the vindication of federal substantive rights defined in 
1 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 784, 49 U.S.C. § 1472(a) (1958). 
2 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 760, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1958) provides: 
"No air carrier ••. shall make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference 
or advantage to any particular person . • • in air transportation in any respect what-
soever or subject any particular person .•• to any unjust discrimination or any 
undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever." 
3 See Texas &: Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) (Federal Safety Appliance 
Acts of 1893); Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 
1956) (Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 
1947) (Communications Act of 1934); Roosevelt Field, Inc. v. Town of North Hemp-
stead, 84 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (Air Commerce Act of 1926). But see Montana-
Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestem Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951) (Federal Power 
Act); Daly v. WBLN Television, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 238 (S.D. III. 1962) (Communications 
Act of 1934). Statutory interpretation may lead to the conclusion that Congress did 
not intend such a remedy to be implied. See T .I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 
U.S. 464 (1959) (Motor Carrier Act of 1935). 
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5tatutory [provisions] .... "4 Thus, in Fitzgerald v. Pan American World 
Airways, Inc.,5 the Second Circuit held that the Civil Aeronautics Act 
provided an implied federal cause of action in behalf of interstate air 
carrier passengers who were discriminated against in violation of section 
404 (b) of the act. 'While the Fitzgerald court spoke of the plaintiff's 
right •to reparation, the exact nature of the damages to which she was 
entitled was not described. However, the federal courts have uniformly 
spoken in -terms of compensation for actual damages suffered by the 
injured party when implying a federal cause of action from a criminal 
statute.6 Thus, the significance of the principal case lies in the court's 
determination that punitive as well as actual damages may be awarded 
to persons mjured by a violation of the Civil Aeronautics Act. 
The federal courts have held punitive damages to be justified when 
a tortious act is accompanied by some aggravating factor.7 The courts 
have further held that such an aggravating factor exists when a carrier 
wantonly disregards its public duty.8 Prior to the principal case, however, 
there does not seem to be a single case allowing punitive damages incident 
to a federal cause of action implied from a criminal statute.9 Nevertheless, 
the court in the principal case felt that the defendant's practice of 
deliberately overselling passenger space on many of its flights constituted 
a wanton disregard of its public duty which justified punitive damages.10 
The domestic airlines' long-standing practice of overselling11 is directly 
tied to the problem of the "no-show," i.e., a ticket holder who fails to 
notify the airlines that he does not intend to make use of his reservation, 
thereby making impossible the resale of the seat reserved for him.12 Faced 
4 Note, Federal Jurisdiction in Suits for Damages Under Statutes Not Affording Such 
Remedy, 48 CoLUM. L. REv. 1090, 1094 (1948). 
r, 221> F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956). 
6 The rationale for this implication is that where a party suffers injury due to 
the violation of a federal statute, Congress would desire the parties for whose benefit 
the statute was passed to have the means to be made whole. See Texas &: Pac. Ry. v. 
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916); Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944). 
7 See Lake Shore &: Mich. So. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893); Milwaukee &: St. 
P. Ry. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489 (1875); Atkinson v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 143 F.2d 477 
(5th Cir. 1944); Cowen v. Winters, 96 Fed. 929 (6th Cir. 1899). 
8 See Lake Shore &: Mich. So. Ry. v. Prentice, supra note 7; Milwaukee &: St. P. Ry. 
v. Arms, supra note 7; Cowen v. ·winters, supra note 7. 
9 Hague v. CIO, 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir.), modified on other grounds, 307 U.S. 496 
(1939), a case on which the principal case relied, would seem to be distinguishable as 
the statutory remedy provided in Hague was a substitute for a common-law tort rem-
edy which had allowed punitive damages. See 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1958). 
The presence in the principal case of an administrative agency with primary jurisdiction 
also distinguishes it from the Hague case. See text infra. 
10 Principal case at 367-68. 
11 See Aviation Week, July 23, 1956, p. 38; Aviation Week, June 11, 1956, p. 38. 
The CAB reported evidence of 33,000 individual cases of "oversales" in 1960. See 
Aviation Weck, Jan. 15, 1962, p. 45. 
12 "No shows" have been estimated to constitute 16% to 18% of the total airline 
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with the prospect of lost revenue resulting from empty seats on flights for 
which there is excess demand, many airlines attempt to calculate the 
potential number of "no shows" on a specific flight and compensate 
for this by overselling. This practice tends to defeat itself by encouraging 
multiple bookings by passengers because of the fear of being "bumped," 
leading to an increase in "no shows," and making necessary greater 
overselling-thus ultimately increasing the possibility of error in deter-
mining the potential number of "no shows" for specific flight.13 The 
basic objection to this approach is that it attempts to solve the "no 
show" problem by inconveniencing the innocent ticketholder while the 
cause of the problem, the "no show," is in no way deterred or pun-
ished.14 The passenger's difficulty in proving sufficient damages to make 
a law suit worthwhile and the failure of the Civil Aeronautics Board to 
take appropriate steps to enjoin oversales15 has allowed the airlines to 
continue this practice at the expense of their passengers with relative 
impunity.16 Viewed against this background, it is hardly surprising that 
a court would desire to give relief to the long-suffering air passenger. 
It seems clear, therefore, that the court, in awarding puni,tive damages, was 
attempting to deter future misconduct in this respect by the airlines,17 
and to force ,the airlines and CAB to seek means less objectionable than 
overselling to solve the critical "no show" problem. 
There is, however, a significant question as to whether the court 
possessed the power to grant such a remedy. First, where Congress has 
set out a criminal statute as a method of punishment and deterrence, 
it is difficult to infer that punitive damages were also intended to be 
passengers boarded. See Aviation Week, July 9, 1956, p. 38; Aviation Week, April 2, 
1956, p. 21. 
13 See Ruppenthal, Bumping the Passenger, 190 NATION 551 (1960); Aviation Week, 
April 2, 1956, p. 21. 
14 The airlines have attempted at three different times since the end of World War 
II to discourage "no shows" by imposing fines upon them. The last plan to be used 
succeeded in reducing "no shows" by 61 % after its adoption in 1956. The plan was 
discontinued in 1958, over the objections of the great majority of airlines, due to the 
insistence of American Airlines, which argued that the increased capacity of the airlines 
and the cost of administration made the plan unnecessary as well as uneco-
nomical. Despite their objections, the other airlines, due to competitive pressure, fol-
lowed American's lead. See Aviation Week, Aug. 4, 1958, p. 40; Aviation Week, July 
21, 1958, p. 29; Aviation Week, May 26, 1958, p. 39. 
15 The CAB as early as 1956 threatened action against the airlines if they continued 
to oversell, but effective action was not taken. Aviation Week, July 23, 1956, p. 38. 
13 Free passage and cash payments were given in some cases to pacify angry victims 
of "oversales." Ruppenthal, Bumping the Passenger, 190 NATION 551 (1960); Aviation 
Week, July 23, 1956, p. 38. 
17 Principal case at 367. The court, in justifying punitive damages, talks also of 
the vindication of the plaintiff's rights as a passenger, but the negligible amount of 
inconvenience suffered by the plaintiff would seem to indicate that this was secondary 
to the court's desire to protect future air passengers from "overselling." 
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used for these purposes. Secondly, the court is faced with the even more 
serious problem of the primary jurisdiction of the CAB. The doctrine 
of primary jurisdiction provides that when Congress creates an administra-
tive agency to regulate a particular area of endeavor, state and federal 
courts are without jurisdiction or power to grant relief to any person 
complaining of any act done, if the nature of the act brings it within 
the sphere of regulation of the agency, until such time as the complaining 
party has exhausted his remedies before the administrative agency.18 
The court in the Fitzgerald oase was careful to point out that since the 
plaintiff was suing on the basis of past injuries, recourse to the CAB 
was unnecessary as the Board had no power -to grant damages for such 
injuries. The CAB does, however, have the power to punish parties for 
violations of the Civil Aeronautics Act.19 It further possesses the power to 
enjoin future violations of the act for ilie purpose of protecting the 
general public.20 The court, by attempting to deter future violations of 
the act, seemingly usurped the CAB's regulatory function and thus inter-
fered with ·the primary jurisdiction of the Board.21 It would seem, there-
fore, that the court overreached its own jurisdictional power in order to 
provide the mistreated air passenger with a sorely needed remedy.22 
L. B. Hirsch 
18 See Adler v. Chicago &: So. Air Lines, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Mo. 1941). 
19 Section 902(a), 72 Stat. 784 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1472(a) (1958) provides: "Any person 
who knowingly and willingly violates any provisions of this Act ••. shall be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be subject for the first 
offense to a fine of not more than $500, and for any subsequent offense to a fine of 
not more than $2000." 
20 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1958, § 1002(c), 72 Stat. 789, 49 U.S.C. § 1482{c) (1958) 
provides: "If ... any person has failed to comply with any provision of this chapter 
or any requirement established pursuant thereto, the Administrator or the Board shall 
issue an appropriate order to compel such person to comply therewith." 
21 Cf. S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n of America, 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951); 
Slick Airways v. American Airlines, 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1951); Adler v. Chicago 
&: So. Air Lines, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Mo. 1941). 
22 Subsequent to this decision the CAB adopted rules whereby the airlines must 
pay to a passenger "bumped" because of an "oversale" five dollars or fifty percent of 
the one-way fare of the first remaining validated flight coupon, whichever is greater, 
but with a maximum charge of forty dollars. In return, the airlines may penalize "no 
shows" under the same formula. See Domestic Trunkline Carriers, IA Av. L. REP. 21, 
258 (CAB March 1, 1962). The federal courts have held that rules approved by the 
CAB, limiting the airlines• liability, become part of the passenger's contract and the 
federal courts will not extend jurisdiction to claims arising under such rules. These 
decisions indicate that if a suit similar to the principal case were now instituted, the 
court would dismiss the case in recognition of the CAB's primary jurisdiction. Lichten 
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951); Toepfer, Inc. v. Braniff Airways, 
Inc., 135 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. Okla. 1955); Wittenberg v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 126 F. 
Supp. 459 (E.D. S.C. 1954); Mach v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 113 (D. Mass. 
1949). 
